Quantifying a Direct Threat: Risks That Health Care Providers Must Take While Treating Infectious Patients - Bragdon v. Abbott by Slowata, Deborah L.
Pace Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 2 Spring 2000
Playing the Psychiatric Odds: Can We Protect the
Public by Predicting Dangerous?
Article 12
April 2000
Quantifying a Direct Threat: Risks That Health
Care Providers Must Take While Treating
Infectious Patients - Bragdon v. Abbott
Deborah L. Slowata
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deborah L. Slowata, Quantifying a Direct Threat: Risks That Health Care Providers Must Take While
Treating Infectious Patients - Bragdon v. Abbott , 20 Pace L. Rev. 569 (2000)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/12
Casenote
Quantifying a Direct Threat: Risks That
Health Care Providers Must Take While
Treating Infectious Patients -
Bragdon v. Abbott
I. Introduction
In 1998, the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Ab-
bott' established that a person with an HIV infection is pro-
tected as a disabled person under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"),2 even when the disease is in its asymp-
tomatic stage. The Court, however, was not able to determine,
based on the evidence adduced at trial, whether there was any
triable issue of fact regarding the significance of the risk for
medical caregivers treating the HIV infected patient. Specifi-
cally, the Court failed to determine the significance of the risk
for a dentist treating an HIV infected patient in his or her office,
and whether that risk would allow the dentist to escape liability
under the ADA.
In Bragdon, the Supreme Court considered two issues
raised by the defendant, Randon Bragdon, on appeal from a
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Sidney Abbott, for a
violation of the ADA. The Court first determined that Ms. Ab-
bott, who had been diagnosed with HIV but was asymptomatic,
met the statutory definition of disabled, and, therefore, was pro-
tected from discrimination under the ADA.3 The second issue
was whether Dr. Bragdon's refusal to treat Ms. Abbott was ex-
empted from the ADA because the act of providing treatment
1. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
2. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
3. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 630-31.
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under normal office conditions was a "direct threat" to Dr. Brag-
don's health. 4
The unresolved issue, which had formed the basis for the
remand in Bragdon, was the determination of the precise risks
of providing health care to people who are infected with HIV,
and whether these risks are substantial enough to create a tria-
ble issue of fact. To date, public health officials have concen-
trated on developing guidelines for risk reduction. However,
while officials claim the risks are low, they have not provided
health care workers with an objective assessment from which a
worker could make a reasonable judgment as to whether a di-
rect threat exists.5 This note will discuss the evolution and pol-
icy behind the ADA and the meaning of the Bragdon decision in
light of the current state of scientific knowledge.
II. Background
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The ADA and the earlier Rehabilitation Act of 19736 at-
tempt, in many respects, to fulfill a similar public policy. The
Rehabilitation Act, and its more recent amendments, were the
manifestation of Congress' belief that disabled people were a
growing part of the population, comprised one of the most disad-
vantaged groups in society, and had rights that needed protec-
tion.7  These rights included the ability to "(A) live
independently, (B) enjoy self-determination, (C) make choices,
(D) contribute to society, (E) pursue meaningful careers, and en-
joy full inclusion and integration in the economic, political, cul-
tural and educational mainstream of American society."8 The
purpose of the statute was to implement this policy by empow-
ering disabled people to maximize these rights.9 The Rehabili-
tation Act attempted to provide this empowerment by state-of-
4. Id. at 648.
5. See Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care
Settings (visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
00023587.htm>.
6. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, P.L. No. 93-112, § 1, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
7. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1998).
8. Id.
9. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1998).
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the-art vocational rehabilitation programs, independent living
facilities, research, and training. 10
Congress wanted the federal government to take a leader-
ship role" by providing incentives under the Rehabilitation Act
to:
(1) Develop and implement comprehensive and continuing State
plans for meeting the current and future needs for providing voca-
tional rehabilitation services to handicapped individuals and to
provide such services for the benefit of such individuals, serving
first those with the most severe handicaps, so that they may pre-
pare for and engage in gainful employment;
(2) Evaluate the rehabilitation potential of handicapped
individuals;
(3) Conduct a study to develop methods of providing rehabilitation
services to meet the current and future needs of handicapped in-
dividuals for whom a vocational goal is not possible or feasible so
that they may improve their ability to live with greater indepen-
dence and self-sufficiency;
(4) Assist in the construction and improvement of rehabilitation
facilities;
(5) Develop new and innovative methods of applying the most ad-
vanced medical technology, scientific achievement, and psycholog-
ical and social knowledge to solve rehabilitation problems and
develop new and innovative methods of providing rehabilitation
services to handicapped individuals through research, special
projects, and demonstrations;
(6) Initiate and expand services to groups of handicapped individ-
uals (including those who are homebound or institutionalized)
who have been underserved in the past;
(7) Conduct various studies and experiments to focus on long ne-
glected problem areas;
(8) Promote and expand employment opportunities in the public
and private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such
individuals in employment;
(9) Establish client assistance pilot projects;
(10) Provide assistance for the purpose of increasing the number
of rehabilitation personnel and increasing their skills through
training; and
(11) Evaluate existing approaches to architectural and transpor-
tation barriers confronting handicapped individuals, develop new
10. See id.
11. See id.
2000]
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such approaches, enforce statutory and regulatory standards and
requirements regarding barrier-free construction of public facili-
ties and study and develop solutions to existing architectural and
transportation barriers impeding handicapped individuals. 12
Thus, the Rehabilitation Act sought to establish broad goals
which the federal government could seek to achieve through
various programs, in cooperation with the states and the pri-
vate sector. 13 The Rehabilitation Act has much to do with the
development of opportunities for the handicapped, but there is
little in the Rehabilitation Act itself that protects the rights of
handicapped people. 14 At the end of the Rehabilitation Act,
however, there is a provision that addresses discrimination
against handicapped employees by employers who are recipi-
ents of Federal Grants. Section 504 provides:
[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, [as defined in the statute], shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 15
It is this section, and its interpretation by the courts, that laid
the foundation for the standards that are applied to Bragdon
and the cases that precede it.
The Rehabilitation Act in general, and Section 504 in par-
ticular, are important to the decision in Bragdon for two rea-
sons. First, the ADA provides that, unless otherwise specified,
it shall not be construed to "apply a lesser standard of protec-
tion than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 . . . or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant to such title." 6 Second, in School Board of
Nassau County, Florida v. Arline7 (a case decided under the
Rehabilitation Act), the Supreme Court defined the standard
that it would later use in Bragdon, for assessing whether an
otherwise discriminatory action would be exempted from the
12. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2, 87 Stat 355 (1973).
13. See id.
14. See id. For example, the Rehabilitation Act as originally enacted did not
provide for the protection of handicapped people against discrimination except re-
garding participation in federally funded programs and activities.
15. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112 § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
16. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1998).
17. School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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ADA because of the significant risk of infection from a commu-
nicable disease. 18
In Arline, the respondent was a teacher who had taught in
an elementary school in petitioner's school district between
1966 and 1979.19 Ms. Arline had been hospitalized for tubercu-
losis in 1957, but her disease remained in remission for the next
twenty years. 20 In 1977, Arline was found to have active tuber-
culosis in her bloodstream. Subsequent cultures, in March
1978, and November 1978, also tested positive. 21 At the end of
the 1978-1979 school year, Arline was discharged from her job.
The record on appeal showed that the petitioner had not dis-
missed Arline because of any wrongdoing, but rather because of
the recurrence of tuberculosis.22
The respondent brought suit against the petitioner for dis-
criminatory termination of her employment due to her disabil-
ity, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. 23 After trial, the
district court held in favor of the defendant school board on all
counts.24 The court reasoned that a contagious disease, such as
tuberculosis, did not meet the definition of "handicap" under the
Rehabilitation Act, and that because of an overriding policy to
protect the public from contagious diseases, the school board
was not required to accommodate her in another position.25
On the plaintiffs appeal, the circuit court was not per-
suaded by the trial court's determination that tuberculosis was
not a disability because the Rehabilitation Act was not intended
to cover communicable diseases.26 They chose instead to look at
the plain statutory construction of Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act, and the regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services implementing Section 504.27 The
circuit court reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that
18. See id. at 274.
19. See id. at 276.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Arline, 480 U.S. at 275.
23. Id.
24. See Arline v. School Board of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 761 (11th Cir.
1985).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 764.
27. Id.
2000] 573
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tuberculosis was a disability under the Rehabilitation Act, and
remanded the case to the district court to more carefully assess
the risks of allowing an elementary school teacher with tubercu-
losis to remain in her position.28 From this decision, the school
board appealed. 29
The Supreme Court addressed two questions: (1) should a
person with tuberculosis be considered a "handicapped person"
under the Rehabilitation Act, and, if so, (2) is a person with tu-
berculosis "otherwise qualified" to teach elementary school as
defined in the Rehabilitation Act?30 The Court established that
the test to be used to determine if a person is disabled under the
Rehabilitation Act must be taken from the statutes and regula-
tions considered together. A person is defined as handicapped if
he or she: "(i) has a physical or mental impairment which sub-
stantially limits one or more of such person's major life activi-
ties, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment."31
The Court further looked to the regulations from the De-
partment of Health and Human Services to provide definitions
for two key terms. 32 "Physical impairment [is defined] as 'any
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs;
respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproduc-
tive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine."33 The regulations also define "major life activities"
which are "functions such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working."34
Using this statutory framework, the Court determined that
Arline was physically impaired (physiological disorder of the re-
spiratory system), and that this impairment was serious
enough to substantially limit one or more major life activities. 35
28. Id.
29. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 277.
30. Id. at 275.
31. Id. at 279 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)).
32. Id. at 279.
33. Id. at 280 (quoting 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(i)).
34. Arline, 480 U.S. at 280 (quoting 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)).
35. Id. at 281.
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This determination, taken in conjunction with her hospitaliza-
tion for tuberculosis (record of impairment), established that
Arline was "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation Act
definition.36
The Court then turned to the question of whether Arline
was "otherwise qualified" to remain employed as an elementary
school teacher.37 The Court recognized that this question could
only be answered by "conduct[ing] an individualized inquiry
and mak[ing] appropriate findings of fact."38 Where a person's
qualification for employment rests on a question of risks from
contagious disease, the Court was concerned that this inquiry
balance the "goal of protecting handicapped individuals from
deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear,
while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns...
as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety
risks."
39
The Court adopted the recommendation of the American
Medical Association, 40 and determined that the inquiry should
include:
[Flindings of facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given
the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk
(how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how
long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is
the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities that
the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of
harm.4'
"In making these findings, courts normally should defer to the
reasonable medical judgments of public health officials."4 2
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The ADA greatly expands the level of antidiscrimination
protection given in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.43
36. Id.
37. Id. at 287.
38. Id.
39. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287.
40. Id. at 288.
41. Id. (quoting Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae 19).
42. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
43. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-189
(1998). Title I proscribes employment discrimination, Title II proscribes discrimi-
2000] 575
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While the Rehabilitation Act focuses on providing opportunities
for the handicapped, the ADA focuses on the elimination of dis-
crimination. 44 The ADA was enacted based on Congress'
findings:
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the popula-
tion as a whole is growing older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate indi-
viduals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such
forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities con-
tinue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in
such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommoda-
tions, education, transportation, communication, recreation, insti-
tutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public
services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individu-
als who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability
have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various
forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion,
the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure
to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclu-
sionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and rel-
egation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or
other opportunities;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have docu-
mented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an infer-
ior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially,
vocationally, economically and educationally;
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minor-
ity who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, sub-
jected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated
to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
nation in access to public services, and Title III proscribes discrimination in public
accommodations and services operated by private entities.
44. See id.
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individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and con-
tribute to, society; .... 45
Congress determined that the "Nation's proper goals... are to
assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency" for people with
disabilities. 46
The purpose of the ADA was:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards ad-
dressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of indi-
viduals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate com-
merce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced
day-to-day by people with disabilities.47
Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the scope of the ADA was
not limited to recipients of federal funding. For employment
discrimination, the ADA covered any "employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management commit-
tee."48 The ADA also prohibited discrimination by public accom-
modations. Included in the definition of "public
accommodation" were: (1) places of lodging (excluding small,
owner occupied inns); (2) restaurants and bars; (3) places of en-
tertainment; (4) convention centers, meeting halls, and places of
public gathering; (5) retail sales and rental stores; (6) service
establishments (including professional offices of health care
providers); (7) public transportation stations; (8) museums, li-
braries and galleries; (9)schools; (10) social service establish-
ments; and (11) places for exercise and recreation.49
The ADA defined "disability" in a similar manner to "handi-
capped" as defined under the Rehabilitation Act. A disability,
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 42 U.S.C. § 12111-112.
49. See id. § 12181.
20001 577
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with respect to an individual, is "(A) a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."50 The ADA
specifically allows a public accommodation to refuse to serve a
disabled person if it would create an unreasonable risk.51 Sec-
tion 302 provides:
[N]othing in this title shall require an entity to permit an individ-
ual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where
such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others.52
"The term 'direct threat' means a significant risk to the health
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification
of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxil-
iary aids or services."53 Congress did not specify the standards
to be applied for assessing "direct threat." The House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, by use of the term, "intend [ed] to codify the
direct threat standard used by the Supreme Court in School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline."5 4
C. HIV and the ADA - Public Policy Concerns
Although people who suffer from Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) are not given specific protection under the ADA, the
legislative history gives a fairly clear indication that Congress
intended them to be protected. 55 As early as 1988, as part of
hearings on the ADA hearings, the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources entered into the record an administra-
tive legal analysis of the impact that the Arline decision would
have on people with HIV under Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
50. Id. § 12102.
51. See id. § 12182.
52. Id.
53. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
54. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 34 (A&P 1990).
55. See id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S.
933 Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the
Handicapped, 101st Cong. n.29 (1989).
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tion Act. 56 Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, attempted to extrapolate from Arline the manner in which
people with HIV would be affected.57
Mr. Kmiec testified:
We believe that symptomatic HIV-infected individuals are handi-
capped under section 504. For these individuals; the disease has
progressed to the point where the immune system has been suffi-
ciently weakened that a disease such as cancer or pneumonia has
developed, and as a result, the individual is diagnosed as having
clinical AIDS. Because of the substantial limiting effects these
clinical symptoms have on major life activities, such a person is
an 'individual with handicaps' for purposes of section 504.58
Mr. Kmiec then turned to the question of asymptomatic
HIV which he believed Arline left unanswered.59 He relied on
an analysis provided by Surgeon General C. Everett Koop to
conclude that people with asymptomatic HIV would meet the
"physical impairment" test under the Rehabilitation Act.60 Sur-
geon General Koop described the progress of the HIV disease:
HIV infection is the starting point of a single disease which pro-
gresses through a variable range of stages. In addition to an acute
flu-like illness, early stages of the disease may involve subclinical
manifestations i.e., impairments and no visible signs of illness.
The overwhelming majority of infected persons exhibit detectable
abnormalities of the immune system. 61
From this analysis, Surgeon General Koop concluded:
[Firom a purely scientific perspective, persons with HIV infection
are clearly impaired. They are not comparable to an immune car-
rier of a contagious disease such as Hepatitis B. Like a person in
the early stages of cancer, they may appear outwardly healthy but
are in fact seriously ill.62
56. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped,
101st Cong. 342-50 (1989).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 342.
59. See id. at 344.
60. Id.
61. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped,
101st Cong. 345 (1989).
62. Id.
20001 579
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Mr. Kmiec then addressed the question of whether asymp-
tomatic HIV limits a "major life activity" as required by the
Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations. 63 He recog-
nized that the courts might have some difficulty finding that a
person with asymptomatic HIV was limited because "such indi-
viduals would not appear at first glance to have disabling physi-
cal effects from their infection that substantially affect the type
of life activities listed in the HHS regulations."4
Mr. Kmiec believed, however, that a strong argument could
be made for inclusion of people with HIV primarily because of
the limitations that HIV infection places on reproduction:
Based on the medical knowledge available to us, we believe that it
is reasonable to conclude that the life activity of procreation -
the fulfillment of the desire to conceive and bear healthy children
- is substantially limited for an asymptomatic HIV-infected indi-
vidual. In light of the significant risk that the AIDS virus may be
transmitted to a baby during pregnancy, HIV- infected individu-
als cannot, whether they are male or female, engage in the act of
procreation with the normal expectation of bringing forth a
healthy child. Because of the infection in their system, they will
be unable to fulfill this basic human desire. There is little doubt
that procreation is a major life activity and that the physical abil-
ity to engage in normal procreation - procreation free from the
fear of what the infection will do to one's child - is substantially
limited once an individual is infected with the AIDS virus.
This limitation - the physical inability to bear healthy children
- is separate and apart from the fact that asymptomatic HIV-
infected individuals will choose not to attempt procreation. The
secondary decision to forego having children is just one of many
major life decisions that we assume infected individuals will make
differently as a result of their awareness of their infection. 65
In the final stages of debate on the ADA, treatment of HIV in-
fected people became one of the last two remaining issues in the
conference committee.66 At issue was an amendment by Repre-
sentative Chapman that would have carved out an exception in
the ADA for special treatment of food handlers with communi-
cable diseases.
63. Id. at 346.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 347-48.
66. See 136 CONG. REC. H4611 (1990).
580 [Vol. 20:569
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On May 17, 1990, Representative Chapman offered an
amendment to Section 103 that would exempt food handlers
with infectious diseases from protection under the ADA if their
employer made reasonable accommodations for assignment to
another job.6 7 By this amendment, Representative Chapman
was allowing the possibility that public perception and eco-
nomic considerations, rather than scientific judgment, might
determine whether a person with a communicable disease could
be denied employment.68 Representative Chapman told the
House that the amendment was necessary because many people
would refuse to patronize a food establishment if they knew
that someone with an infectious disease was handling food. He
was concerned that this could have serious consequences to the
establishment, resulting in the possible loss of the business and
the jobs associated with it.69
Representative Chapman's concerns were not primarily
due to the risks that HIV infected people working in food han-
dling positions might communicate their disease to the public.
To the contrary, he disavowed such a belief when he told the
House that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) had not found one case in over 130,000 where AIDS was
transmitted by a food handler.70
Representative McDermott rose in opposition to the amend-
ment, and articulated Congress' clear intent not to allow dis-
crimination based on public perception. Representative
McDermott made a clear distinction between an exemption
based on scientifically sound health concerns, and one based on
unreasonable fear:
In medical school, I was trained to protect my patients from dis-
ease, to use the best medical knowledge to protect the public
health. So was the gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Rowland. If
67. See 136 CONG. REc. D623, H2478 (1990). The Chapman Amendment pro-
vided that "It shall not be a violation of this Act for an employer to refuse to assign
or continue to assign any employee with an infectious or communicable disease of
public health significance to a job involving food handling, provided that the em-
ployer shall make reasonable accommodation that would offer an alternative em-
ployment opportunity for which the employee is qualified and for which the
employee would sustain no economic damage."
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
20001 581
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either of us believed for one second that this amendment would do
anything to protect the public against any disease, we would sup-
port it.
But the amendment is not about the reality of contagious disease.
It is about the fear of contagious disease. Let us be honest: It is
about the fear of AIDS.
Never mind that we spend millions of dollars on public education
about how AIDS is and is not transmitted. Never mind what the
American Medical Association says, or Dr. Roper of CDC, or for-
mer Surgeon General Koop, or Dr. Rowland, or what everyone on
this floor knows.
As long as anybody in our country remains ignorant, this amend-
ment says, as long as anyone is still afraid, the food service indus-
try may cater to that ignorance and fear.
But that is all right, we are told, because the infected food handler
will be given another job, at the same pay, away from the food. In
a restaurant, I suppose that means washing dishes or working the
cash register. Then, what if someone says: "Maybe you can get
AIDS from a dish, or from handling a dollar bill?" Will we have to
come back and amend this act again?71
The Chapman amendment was passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives by a vote of 199 ayes and 187 noes. 72
During Senate debate on the ADA conference report, Dr.
Sullivan, Secretary of Health, testified that the inclusion of any
provision, such as the Chapman amendment, which allowed an
unreasonable restriction on food handlers with HIV, would be
harmful to disabled people. 73
Sullivan stated:
Any policy based on fears and misconceptions about HIV will only
complicate and confuse disease control efforts without adding any
protection to public health. We need to defeat discrimination
rather than to submit to it. 74
The Bush administration's concerns were echoed by The Associ-
ation of State and Territorial Health Officials:
The appropriate response to public fear is ongoing education, not
legitimizing further discrimination in the statute. For these rea-
71. 136 CONG. REC. D623, H2480 (1990).
72. See 136 CONG. REC. D623, H2483 (1990).
73. See 136 CONG. REC. S9684 (1990).
74. Id.
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sons, the Chapman amendment is not only unnecessary, but is
counterproductive.75
The Senate conferees agreed, noting that "persons with disabili-
ties, including those with infectious diseases and infections,
should be judged on the basis of their qualifications and the
facts applicable to them and not on the basis of fear, ignorance,
and prejudice."76
The general consensus was that the decisions made about direct
threat exemptions for certain people with communicable dis-
eases in general, and HIV in particular, should be based on
knowledge of how these diseases are transmitted. 77 The confer-
ees accepted a substitute provision from Senator Hatch that
requires that the Secretary of Health and Human Services review
all infectious and communicable diseases which may be transmit-
ted through the handling of the food supply; publish a list of those
diseases which are transmitted through the handling of the food
supply; publish methods by which such diseases are transmitted;
and widely disseminate such information regarding the list of dis-
eases and their modes of transmissibility to the general
public .... 78
This provision is embodied in Title I of the ADA. 79
The Senate debate about the Chapman amendment pro-
vided some indication that some members of Congress pre-
sumed that people infected by HIV might be considered
disabled under the ADA.80 Senator Kennedy discussed how im-
portant the ADA would be for people with HlV:
Since the beginning of the HIV epidemic, public health officials
have talked about the importance of antidiscrimination protection
for people with HIV disease. I am extremely pleased that in pass-
ing the ADA, the Congress has taken such action. I would like to
discuss briefly the important protections that the ADA will offer
to people with HIV disease in a range of areas. People with HIV
disease are individuals who have any condition along the full
spectrum of HIV infection-asymptomatic HIV infection, sympto-
matic HIV infection or full-blown AIDS. These individuals are
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. 136 CONG. REC. S9684 (1990).
79. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (1998).
80. See 136 CONG. REC. S9696 (1990).
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covered under the first prong of the definition of disability in the
ADA, as individuals who have a physical impairment that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity. Although the major life ac-
tivity that is affected at any point in the spectrum by the HIV
infection may be different, there is a substantial limitation of
some major life activity from the onset of HIV infection.
Discrimination against people with HIV disease has, unfortu-
nately, been one of the tragic hallmarks of this epidemic. A recent
study by the AIDS project of the American Civil Liberties Union,
'Epidemic of Fear,' documents in detail a range of discrimination
cases that have occurred over the past decade across the
country.81
Senator Kennedy did not just see the ADA as providing HIV
infected people with protection against job discrimination, but
believed that it would apply to Title III as well, and that under
current medical judgment, discrimination would be
unnecessary:
The public accommodations title of the ADA will also offer neces-
sary protection for people with HIV disease. This title prohibits
discrimination in such areas as doctors' offices, dentists' offices,
lawyers' offices, and various other service providers. Of particular
importance, title III prohibits the use of eligibility criteria that
screen out, or tend to screen out, people with disabilities, unless
such criteria can be shown by the public accommodation to be nec-
essary for the provision of its services or goods. Thus, for exam-
ple, a doctor or dentist could not require that a person
demonstrate that he or she was not HIV-infected; for example, by
requiring that the individual take an HIV test, unless meeting
that criterion was necessary to provide services to that individual.
Under current medical and scientific judgments, including cur-
rent CDC guidelines, there is no reason to require proof of HIV-
negativity in any public accommodation setting. Thus, title III
will finally offer needed protection to individuals with HIV
disease.8 2
D. Risks of HIV Infection to Health Care Workers
By their rejection of the Chapman amendment, it seems
clear that Congress was unwilling to yield to any "direct threat"
exemptions based on fear of contagion rather than scientific
81. Id.
82. Id. at S9697.
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judgment. Congress codified the Arline "direct threat" standard
into the ADA,83 but as the Court held in Bragdon, it remains to
be determined whether it would be reasonable for a health care
provider, such as a dentist, to refuse to treat an HIV infected
patient in a normal office setting.8 4
The Center for Disease Control ("CDC") publishes recom-
mendations for safety precautions that health care providers
should follow to reduce the risk of infection from HIV.8 5 The
1987 "Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in
Health-Care Settings" (CDC Recommendations) indicate:
The increasing prevalence of HIV increases the risk that health-
care workers will be exposed to blood from patients infected with
HIV, especially when blood and body-fluid precautions are not fol-
lowed for all patients. Thus, this document emphasizes the need
for health-care workers to consider ALL patients as potentially
infected with HIV and/or other blood-borne pathogens and to ad-
here rigorously to infection-control precautions for minimizing
risk of exposure to blood and body fluids of all patients.8 6
The CDC recommends that risks of HIV be minimized by
the use of "Universal Precautions" which are applied to all pa-
tients regardless of whether their HIV status is known.87 The
CDC Recommendations of Universal Precautions consist of a
six-step procedure that promotes the use of barrier protection,
proper handling of scalpels and needles, and conditions under
which health care workers should not expose themselves to the
risk of HIV.88
83. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 34 (1990).
84. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 649.
85. See Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care
Settings, (visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtm00023587.htm>.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. See id. The CDC recommendations provide that
1. All health-care workers should routinely use appropriate barrier precau-
tions to prevent skin and mucous-membrane exposure when contact with blood or
other body fluids of any patient is anticipated. Gloves should be worn for touching
blood and body fluids, mucous membranes, or non-intact skin of all patients, for
handling items or surfaces soiled with blood or body fluids, and for performing
venipuncture and other vascular access procedures. Gloves should be changed af-
ter contact with each patient. Masks and protective eyewear or face shields should
be worn during procedures that are likely to generate droplets of blood or other
body fluids to prevent exposure of mucous membranes of the mouth, nose, and
20001
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Beyond the general Universal Precautions recommended
for all health care workers, the CDC Recommendations suggest
additional precautions for dentists. The CDC Recommenda-
tions warn dental workers that:
[b]lood, saliva, and gingival fluid from ALL dental patients should
be considered infective. Special emphasis should be placed on the
following precautions for preventing transmission of blood-borne
pathogens in dental practice in both institutional and non-institu-
tional settings.
8 9
The CDC Recommendations advise dentists to take special pre-
cautions to shield themselves from blood and saliva, to sterilize
equipment, and cover surfaces that are hard to clean.90
eyes. Gowns or aprons should be worn during procedures that are likely to gener-
ate splashes of blood or other body fluids.
2. Hands and other skin surfaces should be washed immediately and thor-
oughly if contaminated with blood or other body fluids. Hands should be washed
immediately after gloves are removed.
3. All health-care workers should take precautions to prevent injuries caused
by needles, scalpels, and other sharp instruments or devices during procedures;
when cleaning used instruments; during disposal of used needles; and when han-
dling sharp instruments after procedures. To prevent needlestick injuries, needles
should not be recapped, purposely bent or broken by hand, removed from disposa-
ble syringes, or otherwise manipulated by hand. After they are used, disposable
syringes and needles, scalpel blades, and other sharp items should be placed in
puncture-resistant containers for disposal; the puncture-resistant containers
should be located as close as practical to the use area. Large-bore reusable needles
should be placed in a puncture-resistant container for transport to the reproces-
sing area.
4. Although saliva has not been implicated in HIV transmission, to minimize
the need for emergency mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, mouthpieces, resuscitation
bags, or other ventilation devices should be available for use in areas in which the
need for resuscitation is predictable.
5. Health-care workers who have exudative lesions or weeping dermatitis
should refrain from all direct patient care and from handling patient-care equip-
ment until the condition resolves.
6. Pregnant health-care workers are not known to be at greater risk of con-
tracting HIV infection than health-care workers who are not pregnant; however, if
a health-care worker develops HIV infection during pregnancy, the infant is at risk
of infection resulting from perinatal transmission. Because of this risk, pregnant
health-care workers should be especially familiar with and strictly adhere to pre-
cautions to minimize the risk of HIV transmission.
89. Id.
90. See Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care
Settings (visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtmlV
00023587.htm>. The CDC guidelines for dentists provide:
1. In addition to wearing gloves for contact with oral mucous membranes of all
patients, all dental workers should wear surgical masks and protective eyewear or
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/12
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The CDC acknowledges that a risk of HIV infection from
patient to health care worker exists.91 In July, 1997, the CDC
published a paper, Facts About The Human Immunodeficiency
Virus and Its Transmission, with a stated purpose of "cor-
rect[ing] a few misconceptions about HIV."92 The report advises
that "[i]n the health care setting, workers have been infected
with HIV after being stuck with needles containing HIV-in-
fected blood or, less frequently, after infected blood contacts the
worker's open cut or splashes into a mucous membrane (e.g.,
eyes or inside of the nose)."93 As of December, 1997, the CDC
reported 186 cases of health care workers (of which 7 were den-
tists) who had either a documented or possible occupational
transmission of HIV after percutaneous or mucocutaneous ex-
posure to HIV.94
chin-length plastic face shields during dental procedures in which splashing or
spattering of blood, saliva, or gingival fluids is likely. Rubber dams, high-speed
evacuation and proper patient positioning, when appropriate, should be utilized to
minimize generation of droplets and spatter.
2. Handpieces should be sterilized after use with each patient, since blood,
saliva, or gingival fluid of patients may be aspirated into the handpiece or water-
line. Handpieces that cannot be sterilized should at least be flushed, the outside
surface cleaned and wiped with a suitable chemical germicide, and then rinsed.
Handpieces should be flushed at the beginning of the day and after use with each
patient. Manufacturers' recommendations should be followed for use and mainte-
nance of waterlines and check valves and for flushing of handpieces. The same
precautions should be used for ultrasonic scalers and air/water syringes.
3. Blood and saliva should be thoroughly and carefully cleaned from material
that has been used in the mouth (e.g., impression materials, bite registration), es-
pecially before polishing and grinding intra-oral devices. Contaminated materials,
impressions, and intra-oral devices should also be cleaned and disinfected before
being handled in the dental laboratory and before they are placed in the patient's
mouth. Because of the increasing variety of dental materials used intra-orally,
dental workers should consult with manufacturers as to the stability of specific
materials when using disinfection procedures.
4. Dental equipment and surfaces that are difficult to disinfect (e.g., light han-
dles or X-ray-unit heads) and that may become contaminated should be wrapped
with impervious-backed paper, aluminum foil, or clear plastic wrap. The coverings
should be removed and discarded, and clean coverings should be put in place after
use with each patient.
91. See The Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Its Transmission (last modi-
fied July, 1997) <http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/hiv-aids/pubs/facts/transmis.htm>.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See 9 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIVIAIDS Sur-
veillance Report No 2, 21 (1997).
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III. Bragdon v. Abbott
A. Facts
In Bragdon, the plaintiff Sidney Abbott, visited the dental
office of the defendant Dr. Randon Bragdon in September, 1994,
for a dental appointment. 95 At the time of her visit, she re-
vealed to Dr. Bragdon that she was infected with HIV.96 During
the course of her dental exam, Dr. Bragdon discovered a cav-
ity.97 He informed Ms. Abbott that his "infectious disease pol-
icy" precluded filling cavities of HIV-infected patients in his
office. 98 He suggested that as an alternative, he would be will-
ing to perform the procedure in a hospital for no additional fee if
Ms. Abbott would bear the cost of the hospital facilities. 99
At the time of her visit, Ms. Abbott had been infected with
the HIV virus for years. 00 During that time, her infection was
asymptomatic, and she was apparently healthy despite the vi-
rus that was multiplying in her bloodstream. 101
B. The Holding
1. U.S. District Court for Maine
Sidney Abbott filed suit in the Federal District Court of
Maine, alleging that Dr. Bragdon violated her rights under the
ADA and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) when he re-
fused to treat her in his office.' 0 2 The United States Govern-
ment and the MHRC intervened as plaintiffs, and all parties
moved for summary judgment. 103 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiffs, and denied summary judg-
ment for the defendant. 0 4
The court articulated the issues before it: "With respect to
the ADA, the Parties dispute (1) whether Plaintiffs asymptom-
atic HIV constitutes a disability under the statute, and (2)
95. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D. Me. 1995).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. at 584.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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whether treatment of Plaintiff in Defendant's office poses a di-
rect threat to the health and safety of others such that Defend-
ant may lawfully refuse such treatment."10 5 The court reasoned
that a summary judgment is appropriate "when the moving
party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."10 6
The non-moving party may defeat the motion if, he or she can,
through the use of "affidavits, admissions, deposition testimony
and answers to interrogatories... set forth specific facts estab-
lishing a genuine issue for trial."0 7
The court set forth three elements that must be satisfied to
sustain a violation of Title III of the ADA: (1) that the defend-
ant's office is a place of public accommodation, (2) that plaintiff
is disabled as defined in the ADA, and (3) that treatment of
plaintiff in defendant's office would not pose a direct threat to
the health and safety of others.'08 The first element was not in
dispute.'0 9
The court found that the plaintiff was disabled, as defined
in the ADA, as a matter of law. 10 It applied the standards ar-
ticulated in the ADA: an individual is disabled when he or she
has "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment.""'
The court relied on regulatory guidelines to determine that
HIV, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, is a physical im-
pairment." 2 It then turned to the question of whether asymp-
tomatic HIV substantially limits a major life activity of an
individual who has it. 1 3 The court held that reproduction was a
major life activity, and that HIV limited reproduction because
105. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. at 584.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 585.
109. Id.
110. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. at 587.
111. Id. at 585 (quoting 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)).
112. Id.
113. See id. at 585-86.
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of the added risk that exists for childbearing for a woman with
HIV.114
The court then turned to the question of whether treatment
of the plaintiff in the defendant's office posed a direct threat to
the health or safety of the defendant. To answer this question,
the court looked again to the regulations, and also to the deci-
sion in Arline.115 The standard the court used was whether Dr.
Bragdon's decision was supported by current medical judgment
of a public health official.1 6 The court found Dr. Bragdon's sta-
tistical conclusions too speculative to sustain a summary judg-
ment." 7 The court accepted the testimony offered by the
plaintiff from Wayne Marianos, Director of Oral Health for the
CDC, who participated in the creation of the CDC infectious dis-
ease transmission prevention guidelines for dentists."18
Dr. Marianos testified that "when implemented, the CDC
Recommendations reduce the already low risk of disease trans-
mission in the dental environment, from ... patient to dental
health care worker."119 The court found this testimony persua-
sive as to providing an assessment of "reasonable medical judg-
ment of a public health official."120 The court also rejected the
defendant's assertion that the cases where restrictions on HIV
infected health care workers was held not to violate the ADA
argued in favor of the application of the direct threat exemption
in this case. The court reasoned that because Dr. Bragdon both
took the risk and controlled the means of risk reduction, his
safety was under his control; unlike the patients who have no
means of protecting themselves against a less diligent HIV in-
fected health care worker. 121 The court went on to conclude that
"treatment of plaintiff in [defendant's] office poses no direct
threat to the health or safety of others." 22 Dr. Bragdon ap-
114. See id. at 586-87.
115. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F.Supp. at 587.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 589.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F.Supp. at 591.
121. See id. at 590-91.
122. See id.
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pealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the
trial court's decision. 123
2. First Circuit Court of Appeals
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's reasoning
on all issues. However, the court of appeals took a more com-
prehensive look at the "direct threat" evidence than the trial
court had in its opinion. First, the court considered the evi-
dence presented by the plaintiff, and, unlike the trial court, did
not find Dr. Marianos' testimony "compelling."124 It also refuted
the relevance of eight "sources of information" that Dr. Bragdon
proffered to show that treatment in the office would be danger-
ous. 25 The court found that "[elach piece of evidence is too spec-
ulative or too tangential . . . to create a genuine issue of
material fact [to overcome a motion for summary judgment.]" 126
The court was persuaded by two factors. First, it was im-
pressed by CDC guidelines for universal precautions which,
when implemented, would reduce the risk of infection. 127
Although the report did not say that treating a patient under
the guidelines would be safe, or that no further risk-reduction
measures might make it more safe, the court inferred these con-
clusions. 128 Second, the court was influenced by an American
Dental Association (Dental Association) policy report stating
that patients with the HIV infection could be safely treated in a
123. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997).
124. Id. at 946, n.7.
125. See id. at 946-48. Dr. Bragdon used the following in support of his posi-
tion: (1) an FDA recommendation that "persons who have contact with a patient's
blood through needlestick, non-intact skin or mucous membranes refrain from do-
nating blood for a year"; (2) a CDC report that documented 42 incidents of HIV
transmission to health care workers, including possibly seven dentists; (3) a CDC
report of a dentist who transmitted HIV to his patients; (4) a Stanford Medical
School report that raises concerns of HIV transmission by high speed drills; (5)
that "the CDC did not state that it was medically unwise to take additional precau-
tions" with HIV infected patients; (6) that the risk to health care workers from
patients is documented to be greater than to patients from health care workers, yet
courts have found that restricting health care workers with HIV is not discrimina-
tion; (7) that Dr. Bragdon sustained sharp injuries on a regular basis; and (8) a
study that shows that universal precautions only reduces needlestick exposures by
62%.
126. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 948.
127. See id. at 945-46.
128. See id.
2000]
23
PACE LAW REVIEW
dentist's office. 129 The court of appeals, therefore, affirmed the
decision of the trial court.130
3. The United States Supreme Court
Dr. Bragdon appealed the circuit court decision to the
Supreme Court.13' The Court agreed with the lower courts that
Abbott's HIV infection is considered a disability under the ADA,
but the judgment was vacated and remanded because the court
was concerned that Dr. Bragdon's assertion of a "direct threat"
had not been disproved as a matter of law. 32 Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.133
The Court first examined the definition of disability under
the ADA as, "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of such indi-
vidual; (B) a record of such impairment; or being regarded as
having such impairment."134
The Court limited its consideration to the elements of (A)
above, and performed a three step analysis: (1) is respondent's
HIV infection a physical impairment? (2) is reproduction a ma-
jor life activity under the ADA? and (3) does HIV substantially
limit the major life activity?135 The Court noted that "[tihe
ADA's definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim from the
definition of 'handicapped individual' included in the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973,... and the definition of 'handicap' contained
in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988."136 The ADA re-
quired that the Court not apply a lesser standard than those
applied under the Rehabilitation Act, and the Court concluded
that Congress intended that regulatory interpretations under
the Rehabilitation Act should still be followed. 37
The Court determined that while HIV was not among the
disorders included as a physical impairment in the regulatory
commentary, it met the regulatory definition of a physical im-
129. See id. at 946.
130. See id. at 949.
131. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 628.
132. See id. at 655.
133. See id. at 628.
134. Id. at 630.
135. See id. at 631.
136. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 631-32.
137. See id. at 632.
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pairment, which includes "(A) any physical disorder or condi-
tion . . . affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory,
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, diges-
tive, genito-urinary; hematic and lymphatic; skin; and endo-
crine."138 The Court concluded that HIV is a physiological
disorder "with a constant and detrimental effect on the infected
person's hemic and lymphatic systems from the moment of
infection."'139
Having determined that HIV was a physical impairment,
the Court then considered whether a major life activity had
been substantially impacted. 40  Abbott, the respondent,
claimed that reproduction was the major life activity affected by
her HIV infection, and her decision not to bear children was due
to the increased risks, to both mother and child, caused by the
virus. The Court confined its evaluation to the record on
appeal.' 4 '
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the ADA
was intended to apply to activities having a "public, economic,
or daily character."142 They concluded, instead, that reproduc-
tion, and the sexual dynamics surrounding it, met the definition
of a major life activity under the ADA. 143
The final consideration was whether Abbot's HIV infection
substantially limited her ability to reproduce.'4 The court de-
termined that HIV limited the respondent's ability to reproduce
in two ways: (1) a woman infected with HIV who attempts to
conceive imposes a significant risk of transmitting the disease
to her partner, and (2) has a 25% risk of transmitting the dis-
ease to her child during gestation. 45
The petitioner conceded the existence of the risk of trans-
mission of HIV to the child, but argued that i could be reduced
to 8% through the use of anti-retroviral therapy. 46 The Court
138. Id. at 633.
139. Id. at 637.
140. See id.
141. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 638.
142. Id. at 639.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 639.
145. See id. at 639-40.
146. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 640.
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responded: "[iut cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8%
risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child does
not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction." 147 The
Court further noted that "[wihen significant limitations result
from the impairment, the definition is met even if the difficul-
ties are not insurmountable." 148
The Court agreed with the courts below that no triable is-
sue of fact remained on the question of disability, and that the
respondent was disabled, as defined by the ADA, by her HIV
infection. 149 The Court declined to address the question of
"whether HIV is a per se disability under the ADA."150 The
Court did, however, discuss substantial administrative and ju-
dicial authority for considering symptomatic and asymptomatic
HIV disabilities under the ADA.' 15
The Court considered only one other question from Dr.
Bragdon's petition: "When deciding under Title III of the ADA
whether a private health care provider must perform invasive
procedures on an infectious patient in his office, should courts
defer to the health care provider's professional judgment, as
long as it is reasonable in light of then-current medical
knowledge?"'152
Dr. Bragdon could lawfully have refused to treat Ms. Ab-
bott in his office if her HIV infection "posed a direct threat to the
health or safety of others."153 The Court looked to the ADA for
the definition of direct threat. 54 The statute defines direct
threat as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or
procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." 55
The direct threat provision in the ADA stems from the
Court's holding in Arline,156 and the Court recognized that it
provides a balance between protecting people with disabilities
147. Id. at 641.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 642.
151. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 642-47.
152. Id. at 648 (quoting petition for certiorari).
153. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3)).
154. Id. at 648.
155. Id. at 648-49.
156. See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273.
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and protecting others from significant health risks, such as
those from contagious diseases. 15 7 The Arline decision estab-
lished that (1) a risk must be significant, the fact that it exists is
not enough; (2) the existence of the risk must be determined
from the position of the person refusing the accommodation; (3)
the risk assessment must be based on objective, scientific infor-
mation available to him; and (4) the views of public health au-
thorities carry special weight and authority, but are not
conclusive.158
The Court concluded that the First Circuit was correct
when it declined to rely on Dr. Marianos' testimony.' 59 Simi-
larly, the First Circuit correctly discounted, as lacking scientific
basis, Dr. Bragdon's testimony regarding the enhanced safety of
treating Ms. Abbott in a hospital. 60
The Court was concerned, however, that the First Circuit
might have placed undue reliance on the CDC Recommenda-
tions for Universal Precautions because "they do not assess the
level of risk."'6 ' The Court also believed that the First Circuit
placed undue reliance on Dental Association Policy because it is
a professional association, not a scientific organization, and its
assessments might be based on a combination of risk assess-
ment and professional responsibility. 162
While the Court expressed doubts that petitioner had "ad-
vanced evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact," 63 the
Court acknowledged that it did not have enough evidence from
the record and briefs provided to resolve the question fully.'64
The Court, therefore, remanded the question of direct threat
back to the First Circuit, noting that "[r]esolution of the issue
will be of importance to health care workers not just for the re-
sult but also for the precision and comprehensiveness of the rea-
sons given for the decision." 165
157. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 649.
158. See id. at 649-50.
159. See id. at 650.
160. See id. at 650-51.
161. Id. at 651-52.
162. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 652.
163. Id. at 653.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 654-55.
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Justice Stevens concurred, joined by Justice Breyer. 166 The
Justices both believed that petitioner had not raised a triable
issue of fact, and would have preferred that the decision of the
First Circuit had been affirmed. 167 However, the concurring
Justices realized that they could not obtain a majority for their
position. 16 8 Because they otherwise agreed with Justice Ken-
nedy's reasoning, they concurred. 69
Justice Ginsburg also concurred. 170 Justice Ginsburg
stated that the HIV infection "inevitably pervades life's choices:
education, employment, family and financial undertakings."' 7'
As such, HIV, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, is a disa-
bility under the ADA. Justice Ginsburg also agreed that, be-
cause of the importance of this issue to all health care workers,
a remand was an appropriately cautious action. 72
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice
Thomas and, in part, Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judg-
ment in part and dissented in part.173 The Justices, except Jus-
tice O'Connor, believed that the respondent had not established
that HIV limited her life activity of reproduction. 174 The Jus-
tices looked to evidence that Ms. Abbott did not consider herself
impaired, and there was no evidence that she intended to bear
children. 75 They noted that the First Circuit also erred in es-
tablishing that reproduction is a "major life activity" under the
ADA.176 Further, the dissent argued that the majority failed to
demonstrate a connection between reproduction and the listed
(although not exhaustive) activities illustrated in the Act. 77 In
addition, the dissent argued that respondent's decision not to
have children is a choice, not a limitation. She still would be
166. Id. at 655.
167. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 655-56.
168. See id. at 656.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 656.
171. Id.
172. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 656.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 659.
176. Id.
177. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 659.
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able, if she so chose, to have sexual intercourse, give birth and
rear a child.178
Justice O'Connor joined in the remainder of the opinion. 179
The other dissenting Justices agreed with the remand to the
First Circuit, but did not understand the Court's instructions. 180
When assessing "direct threat" under the ADA, the views of po-
litically appointed public health officers should be given no spe-
cial weight or authority, such views must stand on their own.' 81
The dissent stressed that the Court erred when it did not give
proper credence to the petitioner's evidence, which was suffi-
cient to avoid a summary judgment. 8 2 Justice O'Connor con-
curred in part and dissented in part. 8 3 In addition, Justice
O'Connor was of the opinion that the act of giving birth is not a
major life activity per se because it is not the same as those
activities represented in the statute.'8
4. First Circuit Court of Appeals on Remand
In December, 1998, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
reheard the case to address the issues raised by the Supreme
Court. The First Circuit affirmed its original holding in favor of
the plaintiff, Sidney Abbott.'8 5 To reach this holding, the First
Circuit ordered supplemental briefing, and considered a new
round of oral arguments.' 8 6
The First Circuit looked first to the CDC guidelines to de-
termine whether they, in fact, stated that it would be safe for a
health care worker to treat a patient without taking further
precautions.' 87 The First Circuit noted that the CDC guide-
lines, issued in 1993, "updated earlier versions issued in 1986
and 1987 respectively."'88 The 1986 edition stated that the use
of universal precautions were effective for preventing the trans-
178. See id. at 660-61.
179. Id. at 657.
180. Id. at 662.
181. See id. at 662-63.
182. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 663.
183. Id. at 664.
184. See id. at 664-65.
185. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998).
186. Id. at 88.
187. Id. at 89.
188. Id.
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mission of HIV. 8 9 The 1987 edition reduced the level of precau-
tions previously recommended, and stated that no additional
precautions need be taken beyond those in the revised guide-
lines. 190 The First Circuit held that these earlier statements by
the CDC did provide the risk assessment that the Supreme
Court required, and noted that "[n]either the parties nor any of
the amici have suggested that the 1993 rewrite was intended to
retreat from these earlier risk assessments, and we find no sup-
port for such a position in the Guidelines' text."' 9'
The first circuit next addressed the weight they had given
to the Dental Association Policy. 92 Upon review of a "cornuco-
pia of information regarding the process by which the [Dental
Association] Policy was assembled,"' 93 the court learned that
the Dental Association uses separate committees to develop sci-
entific policies (such as the guidelines on which the plaintiff re-
lied) and ethical policies. 9 This separation, the First Circuit
reasoned, was enough to dispel the Supreme Court's concern
that the Dental Association report was based on professional
ethics rather than scientific conclusions. 95 Based on these con-
clusions, the First Circuit held that Ms. Abbott had met her
burden for summary judgment.196
The First Circuit then reconsidered whether the CDC's
statement of seven "possible" transmissions of HIV to dental
workers provided Dr. Bragdon with a triable issue of fact.197
The First Circuit determined that the CDC used the word "pos-
sible" simply to indicate cases where an occupational origin of
the infection was unknown rather than suspected. 98 Further,
189. See id.
190. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d at 89.
191. Id.
192. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 641, 651-52.
193. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d at 89.
194. See id. See also Brief of the Amicus Curiae: The American Dental Associ-
ation in Support of Sidney Abbott, et al. (last modified Sept. 29, 1998) <http:ll
www.ada.org/prac/position/brag2-4.html>. The ADA Science Council, assessing
data provided by the CDC, concluded that "the risk of occupationally acquiring
HIV-infection through the practice of dentistry is so low as to be almost
undetectable."
195. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d at 89.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 90.
198. Id,
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the First Circuit determined that this definition of "possible"
was documented in scientific literature, and available to Dr.
Bragdon in September, 1994.199 The First Circuit held that this
clarification, in conjunction with the required "objective stan-
dard", dispelled the Supreme Court's concern that the existence
of a possibility of infection might raise a triable issue of fact.200
Finally, the First Circuit reconsidered whether the "42 doc-
umented cases of occupational transmission of HIV to [non-den-
tal] health-care workers" could support Dr. Bragdon's claim by
extrapolation. 20 The First Circuit determined that there was
insufficient evidence of comparable risks between dentists and
other health-care workers to allow such an inference.20 2 The
First Circuit concluded that Dr. Bragdon's arguments were "too
speculative or too tangential . .. to create a genuine issue of
material fact."20 3
In conclusion, the First Circuit emphasized that their de-
termination was case-specific. 20 4 They cautioned that "[tihe
state of scientific knowledge concerning [HIVI is evolving and
... future courts [should] consider carefully whether future liti-
gants have been able, through scientific advances, more com-
plete research, or special circumstances, to present facts and
arguments warranting a different decision."20 5
IV. Analysis
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court took a cautious approach
that left many questions unresolved. The Court declared Sid-
ney Abbott disabled under the ADA by virtue of the limitation
that her HIV infection caused on her ability to reproduce. 206
The Court stopped short, however, of saying that the HIV infec-
tion is a disability under the ADA per se.20 7
The Court did give a strong indication that it would answer
this final question in the positive. It cited opinions from the Of-
199. Id.
200. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d at 90.
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 90 (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 948).
204. See id. at 90.
205. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d at 90.
206. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 641.
207. See id. at 642.
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fice of Legal Counsel, interpretations by the Department of Jus-
tice, interpretations from regulatory agencies, legislative
history, and court opinions to conclude that the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA were intended to protect people with asymp-
tomatic HIV from infection.208 The weight of these authorities,
the Court says, "are consistent with our holding that HIV infec-
tion, even in the so-called asymptomatic phase, is an impair-
ment which substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction."20 9 The Court is unwilling to call asymptomatic
HIV a disability per se in this case, but there is a clear indica-
tion that it might be inclined to do so in the future.
As a result, the Court's decision leaves two possibilities for
future dispute: (1) would an otherwise unimpaired person with
asymptomatic HIV, for whom reproduction was not an issue,
still be considered disabled by her disease? and (2) does the
ADA now apply to someone who is otherwise healthy, but un-
able to reproduce for other reasons, such as infertility? The
early answer to the second question, which is beyond the scope
of this note, is that courts may not be willing to extend Bragdon
to include all cases of infertility.210
With regard to the "direct threat" question, the Court does
not take us far beyond Arline.211 The Court applied the statu-
tory standard for assessing whether a direct threat exists,
which is whether the threat is "a significant risk to the health
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification
of policies, practices or procedures or by the provision of auxil-
iary aids or services." 212 The Court then reiterated its holding
in Arline that the "existence, or nonexistence, of a significant
risk must be determined from the standpoint of the person who
refuses the treatment or accommodation, and the risk assess-
ment must be based on medical or other objective evidence." 21 3
What is new from this decision is the quality of evidence
that the Court is willing to accept, as a matter of law, to deter-
208. See id. at 642-47.
209. Id. at 647.
210. See McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 (D.
Minn. 1998) (declining to extend Bragdon to consider a woman with early meno-
pause as disabled under the ADA).
211. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 648-49.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 649.
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mine whether it is unreasonable for a dentist to refuse to treat
an HIV infected patient in his office. The respondent relied suc-
cessfully in the courts below on the prevention guidelines pro-
vided by the CDC as evidence that treating her was not a
significant risk.214 The First Circuit was willing to infer from
these guidelines that if Dr. Bragdon had followed them, there
would not have been a significant risk to his health.215 The
Supreme Court was unwilling to make such an inference, and
concluded ". . . the Guidelines do not necessarily contain explicit
assumptions conclusive of the point to be decided. The Guide-
lines set out CDC's recommendation that the universal precau-
tions are the best way to combat the risk of HIV transmission.
They do not assess the risk."216
If, as Dr. Bragdon argued in the trial court, the "quantifica-
tion of risk may be impossible,"217 then health care providers
are forced to operate based on an unknown risk.218 The First
Circuit followed the standards of Arline for risk assessment
based on objective information. The assessment should con-
sider: "(1) the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; (2) the
probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and
whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices or proce-
dures will mitigate the risk."219
The First Circuit suggested that Dr. Bragdon might have
overcome summary judgment had he provided evidence that
could have been assessed by these standards, such as "sources
of evidence demonstrating (a) the likelihood of a dental needle-
stick and (b) the likelihood of a dentist contracting HIV from a
needlestick."220 It is possible, therefore, that Dr. Bragdon might
have been able to develop an argument from sources such as the
CDC, which has reported HIV seroconversion (transmission) for
percutaneous exposure at .3%,221 coupled with data on dental
needlestick frequency.
214. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 946.
215. Id.
216. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 651-52.
217. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. at 588.
218. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 943.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 948.
221. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Case Control Study of
HIV Seroconversion in Health-care Workers after Percutaneous Exposure to HIV-
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Dr. Bragdon failed to provide evidence that the risks to
dentists were similar to the risks to health-care workers in gen-
eral. If, in the future, a dentist were able to show that he or she
is at a risk comparable to a surgeon, he or she could find sup-
port in scientific literature to indicate a lifetime risk as high as
10%.222
Those who would consider the legal duty of a dentist to
treat HIV patients in his or her office to be settled law would do
well to consider the caution given by the First Circuit on re-
mand. While the risk of HIV infection may be small, the devas-
tating consequences should it occur 223 may resonate with a jury.
It might be possible, because of scientific advances or better re-
search, for a dentist to defeat a future motion for summary
judgment and have the ability to convince a jury that the risk,
based on objective scientific evidence, is sufficient to obtain the
"direct threat" protection of the ADA.
V. Conclusion
Does Bragdon v. Abbott224 establish the right of asymptom-
atic HIV patients to be treated no differently by their dentists
than patients who do not suffer from the disease? The Court
clearly answered in favor of the presumption, absent a clear
showing of a direct threat to the dentist by objective scientific
evidence, that a patient with HIV may not be treated differently
under the ADA.225 However, the Court also left open the possi-
bility that new (or better-defined) scientific information could
yield a different result.226
It was plainly the intent of Congress to provide protection
against discrimination for those who suffer from HIV. How-
ever, Congress was not willing to impose a duty on dentists or
infected Blood - France, United Kingdom, and United States, August 1994-January
1998, 275 JAMA 4 (1996).
222. See James G. Wright et. al., Mechanisms of Glove Tears and Sharp Inju-
ries Among Surgical Personnel, 266 JAMA 12 (1991).
223. See 9 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIVIAIDS Sur-
veillance Report 2, 13 (1997). The CDC indicates a mortality rate of over 90% for
adult and adolescent cases diagnosed in 1987 and prior. Of a total of 633,000 cases
reported through December, 1997, 61% (385,968) had died.
224. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 624.
225. Id. at 649.
226. Id.
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other health care providers to take unreasonable risks to their
own safety. Thus, they included the direct threat exception to
equal accommodation under the ADA.227
Should a health care provider, such as Dr. Bragdon, be able
to establish the existence of an unreasonable risk despite the
use of universal precautions, it is likely that the issues in Brag-
don v. Abbott could arise again.228 Should this occur, either the
courts or Congress will be called upon to decide, as a matter of
public policy, whose rights, those of the patient or those of the
doctor, will be protected.
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